

# Polling Bias or Corrupted Count?

## Accepted Improbabilities and Neglected Correlations in 2004 US Presidential Exit Poll Data

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### [Opening Slide]

Thank you Paul. It's a great privilege to speak before this group in this forum. There are two questions balanced before us today. Most of my talk today will concern probabilities. I look at *im*probabilities in the official story of what happened in the exit polls and the election, and ask you – who understand and work with probabilities every day – to consider “How much confidence do we have in the official count – and the explanations about the exit poll discrepancy?”

### [Slide: Two Questions]

The companion question is “How much doubt must we have before we *demand* answers?” Although we will not dwell upon this question today, it is one that I believe we can answer with certainty. During his recent confirmation hearings, John Roberts acknowledged *of the right to vote that it is*, in fact, *preservative of all other rights*. Without the power to elect our representatives, and especially, to remove from office those who misuse power – ultimately, we have no rights at all.

### [Slide: John Roberts]

I come to the subject not as a specialist, and least of all in statistics, but rather as an interdisciplinary scholar familiar with the fields in question willing to ask what appear to be obvious, important questions for which reasonable answers have not been forthcoming.

Personally, I'm not even very political, but I did follow this election closely, and like many Americans heard throughout the day that exit polls indicated a convincing Kerry victory. On election night, I sat down to watch coverage with my computer in my lap, and was astounded by the contrast between the exit poll projections and TV reports of official vote counts.

### [Slide: Battleground States]

Highly unlikely – to say the least! I mean these were exit polls. They're not some prediction about what some people might do on election day; they are anonymous, confidential reports of what they have just done. It's not like estimating the volume of snow days in advance, but rather by measuring it that day at several strategically selected locations.

[Slide: Ohio probability density]

But here's Ohio's result. Same for Florida, Pennsylvania, and other states.

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I waited for a few days expecting an explanation. When none came, I wrote a paper saying that this was something that needs to be explained or investigated and asked for the exit poll data. Others academics as well as Congressmen, the PA Secretary of State, and pollsters did so too. We were told by Mr. Mitofsky that an explanation would be forthcoming and that data would eventually be made available. While we waited for that, I researched the mechanics of voting and vote counting in the US. Here's a three minute version of what I learned. I'm going to fly through this so that I can get to what we actually need to discuss here today. Take in what you can; and you can read my article and forthcoming book to learn more about it.

[Slide: Exit Poll]

As for the **exit poll**; there seemed no obvious methodological shortcomings. Certainly it was a far more professional an operation than the Ukranian exit polls in which the nation's media invested so much confidence. So, it's still a mystery that the poll should be so far off.

[Slide: vote suppression]

Could the count be off? Well, there's extensive vote suppression. You're probably familiar with some, but not all of these techniques.

[Slide: vote suppression success]

These techniques are so effective that the US ranks #139 out of 172 countries in the world for election turnout.

[Slide: election turnout comparative rank]

But we're not going to talk about this. Exit polls, by design, survey only those who actually cast a ballot.

[Slide: Blackwell, Harris]

I reflected a bit on elections administered by campaign managers, and the *utter* untrustworthiness of such a situation. Imagine the uproar in this country if a football championship were decided in a game where the home team's coach doubled as referee!!

But we're going to put that aside also. If a presidential election were won by biased penalty calls and ball placement, well there's not much to say or do. That's the system. Suppress as many of your opponent's votes as possible, lose a few percent more, and perhaps stuff a few ballot boxes here and there. And as Mr. Mitofsky likes to say the exit polls might be too blunt a tool for discernment of such transgressions.

[Slide: Ohio Vote Fraud]

But the exit polls suggest not tens of thousands of stolen or denied votes, but rather *millions* in jurisdictions throughout the country. Can it happen? Well, look at Ohio.

[Slide: Ohio Vote Fraud II: Non recount]

The Conyers report, and forthcoming books by me and others document an extraordinary variety of malfeasance around Ohio, the cumulative effect of which was far more than enough to switch

the state from Bush to Kerry. And because there was never a legitimate manual count of randomly selection precincts witnessed by observers, we have no way of knowing.

**[Slide: From a Hocking Co. affidavit]**

But Ohio was probably not exceptional, but rather, due to the closeness of the official count, it was the only state where any real investigation has taken place

And these are only examples of observable fraud. There's a whole other class of voting technology which makes observance impossible: 30% of Americans voted on electronic machines that provide absolutely no confirmation that votes are counted as cast. In such a system, millions of votes can be switched. One of the many simple ways it could be done is through a mere two lines of buried software code:

**[Slide: Electronic Voting]**

- On November 2, 2004 9 am change 1 of every 10 Kerry votes to Bush.
- On November 2, 2004 at 9 pm delete this and the previous line.

**[Slide: Las Vegas Slot Machines]**

We'd have no way of knowing. The instructions would have been originally been buried among millions of lines of code that we can't examine anyway; it's proprietary. And subsequently would disappear anyway in the unlikely event that that the software were examined.

\* \* \* \* \*

OK, so that's the context from which we begin our examination. A corrupted count is not only possible, but evidence of malfeasance is widely documented in Ohio, and electronic voting leaves little reason to place any faith in the count. In fact, the confirmation of a well conducted exit poll would be *just about the only reason we should* believe the results of electronic voting or those of other unverified machine counts.

**[Slide: Snohomish County: Parallel Systems and Divergent Results]**

So, now that we have our presumptions properly calibrated, let's see what we can ascertain from the exit poll data. In order to do so, I want to cut through all the discussion of the exit poll veracity and reliability and focus on one critical statistic, Precinct Level Disparity (PLD). Mr. Mitofsky will call it WPE – Within Precinct Error – but that presumes polling error when whether it's polling error or count corruption is precisely the question.

The PLD is the difference between the official vote tally in just those precincts where exit polls were conducted and the exit poll numbers in those very same precincts. In other words, it is the difference between who people said they voted for as they walked out of the voting booth, and the way those votes were officially recorded.

**[Slide: Precinct Level Disparity]**

On Inauguration Eve, Edison/Mitofsky released a report on the exit poll discrepancy, and reported that, in fact, the discrepancy was even larger than early exit polls

**[Slide: Official vs Exit Poll Survey Results]**

Across the nation, among 114,559 sampled voters at 1,460 precincts, the difference between how people said they voted for as they walked out of the voting booth, and the way those votes were officially recorded was a whopping 6.5 percentage points.

Perhaps the public at large cannot appreciate this number. But you in this room can. The margin of error on such a survey is a small fraction of 1%.

[Slide: Election outcome changes]

The discrepancy is highly consequential. Whereas according to **official results, Bush won a slim victory**, Precinct Level Disparity indicates a decisive Kerry win.

[Slide: Distribution of Standard Deviations]

In their report, Edison/Mitofsky also released state PLD. In state after state, the deviation is extraordinary. So extreme that you might want to just throw out the data. It just can't be ... but the data is good.

[Slide: only two explanations]

Moreover, there are only two possible explanations for PLD – Mr. Mitofsky and I agree on this. They are

- 1) Kerry voters disproportionately – and by a large margin – agreed to fill out the questionnaires offered by pollsters
- 2) The votes were counted incorrectly.

Of these two, Edison/Mitofsky rejected the latter out of hand and accepted the former because it must be so. Edison/Mitofsky presume that “Kerry voters were more likely to participate in the exit polls than Bush voters” despite:

- acknowledging they had no explanation for why (p.4)
- any evidence that they in fact did so.
- any independent evidence (evidence other than survey results that do not match the count) of non-response bias in this or other exit poll. (experiments actually conducted suggest *no* response bias, every when participation rates are much lower than 53%)

[Slide: only two explanations]

A large percentage of their report analyzes interviewer characteristics -- Completion Rates, Age Gender education, when hired, and training; and interactions among these. They find that PLD is higher:

[Slide: Interviewer characteristics]

- when interviewers are more than 25 feet away from the polling place
- among with younger interviewers
- among interviewers with advanced degrees
- among interviewers in large precincts.

In no way do I rule out the possibility of interviewer effects – indeed, I can't; I don't have the data – but I do point out, first, that this explanation cannot conceivably provide a complete explanation for the discrepancy.

[Slide: Interviewer Effects? Location]

In every category of interviewer, no matter how Edison/Mitofsky slices and dices their numbers, PLD still remains well outside the polling margin of error.

It's true that PLD is higher when the interviewer was further away, but even inside the polling place, there was a 5.3 percentage point deviation between how people said they voted for as they walked out of the voting booth, and the way those votes were officially recorded.


**[Slide: Interviewer Effects? Interviewer Age]**

Age is a big factor in their analysis, but even in the "best performing" age groups, 35-44 and over 65, there was a 4 percentage point deviation between how people said they voted and the way those votes were officially recorded.

**[Slide: Interviewer Effects? Education]**

Edison/Mitofsky observes that interviewers with post-graduate degrees have a higher PLD, but all groups have at least a 4 percentage point deviation between how people said they voted and the way those votes were officially recorded.

Second, it's not at all clear that those groups with lower mean PLDs are most accurate. Interviewers with advanced degrees had lowest miss rates and lowest refusal rates suggesting that their results are likely the *most* accurate. And those with the least education had the *highest Absolute* error, meaning that their results were all over the place. Their results were the *least* accurate.



**[Slide:**

Third, these correlations may well indicate count corruption. Consider location. It's understandable, perhaps, that absolute error rates might be higher when the interviewer was further away, but it's not at all clear why *mean PLD* should increase. On the other hand, one also must ask why an election officer, or a secretary of state would be trying so hard to keep observers from being close to the polling place. In Ohio, Edison/ Mitofsky had to sue to force Ken Blackwell to allow their people anywhere near the polls.

**[Slide: Interviewer Effects? Interviewer Age]**

Fourth, any time you partition categories you will get variation; some groups will have lower or higher numbers. That's probably the case in the age differences. Do enough partitions and correlations, and you're guaranteed to get a false finding. That's why scientists are expected to conduct theory driven analyses, not to fish for findings and then concoct an explanation. Is there any good reason to expect that PLD should drop in the 35-44 age range, rises over the next two age groups and then drops again among those over 65?

**[Slide: Interviewer Effects? Summary]**

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And that's about all that anyone other than Mr. Mitofsky and his friends can say about interviewer effects. That's because no one else has the data. The data needed to properly investigate the integrity of the election has never been made available to any independent investigator. Rather it remains the proprietary property of the media consortium.

If we had precinct level summary data, we could physically investigate precincts with high PLDs, some of which literally have impossibly high PLDs? Why were they so high?

If we had County level data we could statistically examine effects of voting technology and partisan control

**[Slide: Biased Polls or Biased count]**


We do not have this data. Nevertheless, much of the data that Edison/Mitofsky provide in principle to support their thesis, actually does just the opposite.

Let's begin with the precinct level data used in the January report. Edison/Mitofsky provide some data by quintiles, including response rates as a function of precinct partisanship.

**[Slide: If Bush voters were less likely to participate]**

Predominantly Kerry-voting precincts are on the left, predominantly Bush-voting are on the right, in five divisions. If Kerry voters were more likely than Bush voters to fill out the questionnaire, what would you expect to see in the data? Well, the first thing you'd expect – what is practically a mathematical necessity – is that the response rate for the questionnaire would be higher in Kerry strongholds than in Bush strongholds.

But there is no such trend. In fact, there's a slightly higher response rate in Republican areas.



**[Slide**

When a group of academics published a paper on this, it was ignored by the media and dismissed by others because the thesis would hold up "if Bush voter completion rates were low only where Kerry voter completion rates were high...."

Although such a proposal is mathematically possible, it is vastly counter-intuitive, improbable, and also inconsistent with the exit-poll discrepancy data provided in "Edison/Mitofsky."

**[Slide USCountVotes]**

Indeed, the only way that reluctant Bush respondent theory is even mathematically possible is if somehow, Bush voters participated freely in the polls in districts where they were in the majority, but were reluctant when they were in the minority, and Kerry voters behaved in exactly the opposite manner in implausible numbers.

But implausibility is recurrent in explanations of polling error and bias.

In the January report, Edison/Mitofsky provide, along with PLD figures, statewide participation rates. This gives us a different test of differential response. Again, to satisfy the presumption that Kerry voters were 14% more likely you would almost have to see a negative correlation between Bush support and participation rate:

**[Slide: If Bush voters were less likely to participate II]**

But on the state level, there is no such trend either. Just as Bush precincts show *higher* rather than lower response rates, so do Bush states

**[Slide Participation Rate by Bush % of State Vote]**

This is true whether you measure Bush support by the vote or the polls.

**[Slide Participation Rate by Bush % of State Exit Poll]**

Just to make clear what we're saying. The small, but significant positive correlation between Participation and Bush voting is not particularly important. Rather, it is that given this relationship, the Edison/Mitofsky assertion of disproportionate participation by Kerry voters is highly implausible.

Other details of the data make it that much more implausible yet. Maybe Republicans are reluctant to fill out the questionnaire when in the minority among aggressive Kerry supporters, but not when they're among friends. That could conceivably account for the response rates in the charts displayed. But if that were the case, then PLD would necessarily be concentrated in the Democratic precincts, and not in the Republican areas where the response rate is nice and high and, if anything, it's the Democrats who have something to be shy about.

But that too is *not* the case.

**[Slide PLD rises with Bush voters]**

There's no PLD at all in the Kerry strongholds, but the discrepancy is highest on the right side of the spectrum – in those areas where Bush voters would have had to participate at such healthy rates to make up for their lack of participation in the Kerry strongholds.

In fact, the stronger Bush's support, the greater the disparity.

At the same time that outlandish numbers are required to satisfy the Edison/Mitofsky presumptions, explanations and correlations screaming out for investigation are neglected.

Consider the numbers in this slide: In those precincts where the official count was 80% or higher for Bush, average PLD – the difference between who people said they voted for as they walked out of the voting booth, and the way those votes were officially recorded – was an astounding 10 percentage points. For example, in those precincts where Bush received 90% and Kerry 10% of the vote in the official count, average exit poll margins of 85% to 15%. In other words, in these Bush strongholds all across the country, Kerry, on average, received only about two-thirds of the votes that exit polls predicted he should have received.

If fraud were afoot, it would make sense that the president's men would steal votes in GOP strongholds, where they control the machinery of government and there's little danger of independent oversight, let alone prosecution.

**[Slide Is PLD different for Swing States? (Edison/Mitofsky)]**

Other damning correlations are similarly neglected. The first priority was, of course, to win the election. Thus, it would make sense that votes would be most vigorously coveted in the swing states that would determine the winner of the Electoral College. Sure enough, Edison/ Mitofsky found PLDs higher in precincts in swing states than in precincts of other states. But they do not

even consider the most obvious explanation. It's difficult to infer what they mean in their interpretation. Perhaps Mr. Mitofsky can explain.

**[Slide Is PLD different for Swing States? (State level)]**

A State level PLD analysis corroborates Edison/Mitofsky's precinct level data.

**[Slide Paper Bar Graph]**

Yet another damning correlation from the report concerns voting technology. Indeed, only consideration of fraud in Edison/Mitofsky's 77 page report is the summary dismissal: "Exit polls do not support the allegations of fraud due to rigging of voting equipment." This because they found no systematic differences between PLD in precincts that used newer electronic touch screen and optical scan voting systems and those that used the older punch card and mechanical voting equipment. But the difference between electronic voting machines and the others is the lack of verifiability. If the ballots are never manually counted anyway or if there is a lax chain of custody on the ballots, then all machines are as vulnerable to programming fraud as electronic machines.

**But look at the difference between Paper ballots and machines of all types!**

**[Slide Edison/Mitofsky Dismissal of Paper Correlation]**

Edison/Mitofsky attempts to partition this difference away by arguing it is a function of paper's predominance in rural precincts. But to do so requires: First, a partition to create a statistically meaningless group (N=5), second ignoring that paper has lower PLD than machines in "urban areas" regardless. And third, a sharp difference between paper and machines in the statistically significant "rural/small town category." PLD in machine-counted precincts is more than three times PLD in precincts with paper ballots.

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What other patterns would we expect if the source of the PLD were not in the poll but in the vote count?

**[Slide African American Correlation]**

Traditionally, African Americans are the most disenfranchised group in the country. 1/3 of Florida males are legally disenfranchised due to felony convictions handed out like high-school diplomas. But beyond that, phony felons lists, shortages of voting machines, long lines, lawyers hired to intimidate voters, etc. have all served to disenfranchise blacks. And is PLD higher in states with more blacks? Yes, it is:  $p=.01$ . And it is robust in every multivariate regression of the data we could put together. There is no apparent polling explanation; so one must at least consider the possibility that this higher PLD indicates that blacks are being disenfranchised by yet other means as well.

**[Slide Governors]**

Where Republicans controlled the State government, there might have been greater opportunity to steal votes. Was PLD higher in states with Republican Governors than with Democratic governors? Here's what we find:

**[Election Day Administration]**

Yet one more variable that could have nothing to do with polling error, but everything to do with a corrupted count are election day problems. On Election Day 2004, MSNBC, with the



collaboration of the Fels Institute of Government, two electoral reform groups -- one Democratic and one Republican -- and VoterLink Data Systems, produced an Election Incident Monitor. Voters called a toll-free telephone number to redress voting problems. The system recorded their complaints and reported the number of calls by state. On a per capita basis, these are the results. The correlation with PLD is significant, indicating that those problems did in fact result in corrupted counts.

### **[Pres vote in 2004 based on 2000 Pres vote – Election Night]**

When a company cooks the books or when a scientist fudges figures, a contradiction is created. It may be difficult to detect, and more difficult yet to explain. But the beauty of numbers is an integrity in the entirety. When an irreconcilable contradiction exists, it is a sure sign that something is amiss.

If, in fact, Kerry voters disproportionately participated in the polls, adjustments would be straightforward. Disproportionate response would still be a huge assumption, but could thus “correct” the polls by weighting Bush voters accordingly. If after doing that, the numbers make sense and correspond to the official tallies without a contradiction, disproportionate response might be plausible, if not persuasive.

Because NEP pollsters considered it their job to adjust their exit poll survey results to conform to the official count, they undoubtedly did their best to make the numbers match, but to do so, NEP had to enter into a Wonderland of numbers.

Each row of this slide represents the 2004 presidential choice of the category of 2000 voter indicated in the first column. The first row represents the 2004 voting preferences of those who reported that they did not vote in the 2000 election. The number in parenthesis indicates that this category represents 17% of overall total number of respondents. The second row represents the 2004 voting preferences of those who reported that they voted for Gore in 2000 (39% of respondents), etc.... The columns represent how these demographic segments cast their vote in 2004. For example, among respondents who voted for Gore in 2000, 8% voted for Bush, 91% voted for Kerry, and 1% voted for Nader in 2004.

Note that the numbers strongly suggest – like both precinct and state-level data – that Republicans and Bush voters were not underrepresented in the 2000 exit polls, but, if anything, overrepresented. Given that Gore won a plurality of the votes in 2000, if all segments of the population were equally represented in the exit polls, there would be slightly more Gore voters than Bush 2000 voters. Instead, we see 2% less.

### **[Pres vote in 2004 based on 2000 Pres vote –Nov 3]**

In their attempt to match their survey results to the official count, on election night, NEP made two sets of adjustments. First they weighted Bush respondents in each category more heavily so that they now report, for example, that 45%, rather than 41%, of 2000 election non-voters supported Bush. They also weighted particular respondent categories more heavily. And despite evidence indicating otherwise, NEP assigned greater weight to Bush 2000 voters, such that they assume the actual electorate in 2004 consisted of 43% Bush 2000 voters and only 37% Gore 2000 voters.

By these calculations, the 2004 electorate comprised 44.5 million Gore 2000 voters and a remarkable 51.7 million Bush 2000 voters—remarkable because in 2000 Bush received only 50.5

million votes. If we are to believe the NEP figures, one in seven Gore voters through death, disability, or divine intervention disappeared from the electorate; but no such fate befell a single Bush 2000 voter; indeed another million miraculously appeared.

And even despite these wonderous “corrections”, their “corrected” exit poll figures are *still* left with a discrepancy far greater than the survey margin of error.

**[Table Expected Presidential Votes Based on Changes from 2000]**

In the 2004 campaign, Bush and Kerry each had four potential sources of votes: their own base, their opponent’s base, those who previously voted for Ralph Nader and new voters. What changed between 2000 and 2004?

Line (1) denotes the votes of Bush’s 2000 base. Bush held 43.5 million votes (90%), while Kerry captured 5 million votes (10%). A strong performance for Bush.

Line (2), however, shows the vote totals from Kerry’s even stronger performance among Gore voters. Kerry held 45.5 million (91%), while Bush captured only 4 million Gore votes (8%).

These numbers derive from the exit polls, but they are consistent with everything else we know about the campaign. Both sides, but especially the Republicans played to the party faithful.

Line (3) denotes the redistribution of 3rd party votes: Not surprisingly, Kerry amassed the lion’s share of the mostly ex-Nader 2000 third party votes, 64%. Bush did well to capture half-a-million of them.

Line (4) denotes the distribution of those who did not vote in 2000. Bush’s 41% share of this number represents 8.5 million votes; Kerry’s 57% share is 12 million votes. Bush did well to attract as many new voters as he did. But among new voters and others who did not vote in 2000, Democrats, as is generally the case, won by a healthy margin. Even if Karl Rove was correct that were 4 million potential evangelical Bush voters that failed to turn out in 2000, the fact is that there were many millions more potential Democratic voters that did not vote in 2000 (or voted for Nader). The poor, the less educated, and the young, all Democratic constituencies in 2004, traditionally have among the lowest election turnout, and 2000 was no exception. In 2004, the Democrats ran an unusually well organized and unusually well funded get-out-the-vote drive (whereas Republicans are usually well organized and funded), and they simply had many more potential voters to draw upon.

Added together, the numbers indicate that Bush received 57 million votes, 6.5 million more than he received in 2000— a good showing, but far fewer than the eleven-and-a-half million vote increase certified in the official state counts. Kerry’s totals from the four vote sources aggregate to 63.5 million votes, almost 5 million more votes than the official totals credit. All told it amounts to a discrepancy on the order of 10 million votes.

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Look back at the original two questions I’d asked you to consider.

**[Slide: Two Questions]**

1. How much confidence do we have in the official count – and the explanations about the exit poll discrepancy?
2. How much doubt must be raised about the count – and the explanations about the exit poll discrepancy – before we demand answers?

Many people say that they are disinclined to raise questions or challenge the count because it implies a serious accusation. Altering election results is criminal. One does not charge criminal conduct without *strong* evidence.

True enough, but there's all the difference between putting someone on trial for electoral fraud – in which, as in all criminal cases, we presume innocence – and trusting in the results of an election. The public has every right to be skeptical about whether there's a fair count in an election, and to have the skepticism proven wrong by overwhelming evidence. Just as we would for a fair count of our money in the bank or the value of stock in a company. In a functional democracy, this test ought to be met without much question. In other words, you shouldn't HAVE to presume a fair count.

On the other side: how much doubt is there? Not only are there doubts inherent in unverified and unverifiable vote counts, and campaign managers serving as referees, but we have documented malfeasance in Ohio, and evidence of it all over the country.

The exit poll data not only suggest doubt, but point sharply toward a corrupted count.

1. The huge and unprecedented **Precinct Level Disparity** -- the difference between who people said they voted for as they walked out of the voting booth, and the way those votes were officially recorded.
2. The extraordinary distribution of standard deviations among states
3. The lack of a theory that could explain disproportionate response (Interviewer effects at most could only explain some portion of it and even that possibility is not compelling)
4. The lack of substantiation of disproportionate response.
5. Data from Edison/Mitofsky showing *higher* response rates in precincts where Bush voters predominated
6. Data from Edison/Mitofsky showing *higher* response rates in *states* where Bush voters predominated
7. The near mathematical impossibility of disproportionate response given (5) and (6).
8. Extraordinary high PLD in Bush strongholds across the country, in which Kerry, on average, received only two-thirds of the votes that respondents reported to have cast for him.
9. PLD was higher yet in swing states where electoral votes were at stake.
10. PLD was still higher in the critical battleground states of Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania the election was expected to be won – and was won.
11. The dramatic difference between PLD in precincts with machine technologies and those with paper ballots. Precincts where votes were counted by machines were many standard deviations beyond the polling margin of error.
12. States with Republican governors averaged higher statewide PLD, a relationship inconsistent with polling bias, but indicative of electoral fraud.
13. African American population is a robust predictor of PLD. Given the lack of any reason to suspect polling bias as a cause, and the many ways in which this population has long been disenfranchised, count corruption would seem the most likely cause.
14. Election day voting problems, a variable that have nothing to do with polling error, but everything to do with a corrupted count, correlates with PLD.

15. Reported Presidential vote in 2000 among respondents (Bush 41%-Gore 39%), also indicates that Bush voters were over, rather than under-represented in the exit polls. (Gore won a plurality in 2000 so if there were no response bias, we would expect slightly more Gore respondents than Bush respondents.)
16. To “correct” for presumed disproportionate response, NEP created a mathematical impossibility: a 2004 electorate consisting of 52 million voters who cast their ballot for Bush in 2000, an election in which he received only 50 million votes.
17. And even then, after making these implausible and impossible adjustments, the adjusted exit polls still deviate from the official count by a margin well beyond the margin of polling error.

In short, improbability after improbability in the official story; neglected correlation after neglected correlation pointing toward fraud.

### **["Time to Set the Record Straight"]**

Mr. Mitofsky is man of enormous accomplishments and intelligence, a man who I have admired greatly in our previous interactions, all of which have been extremely cordial.

But I was taken aback by his "abstract." It reads less like a prologue to thoughtful discussion than an attempt to shout down anybody who dares to ask questions.

For him say that the exit polls did not indicate a victory for John Kerry, is stunning. He might as well stand before us and say "blue is red."

Don't let him use pejorative labels such as "conspiracy theorists," to dismiss honest inquiry with empty rhetoric.

When he writes about "inexperienced people trying to make sense of complex statistical data," it means an excuse for keeping under wraps what may well be evidence of a stolen election.

But although the abstract stunned me, I'm hopeful regarding our talks here today. In my interviews and correspondence with Warren, I have been struck that he is not only brilliant, but funny and at his core, honest, decent, a man of rare experience and even wisdom. He may well have it within him to truly "set the record straight." And perhaps you in the audience have it within your powers to help compel him to do so.